Government secret services have expressed concern about security and integrity of Huawei devices. Which is fair enough, that’s what they do.
Problem is that, to date, there is no public proof that Huawei devices are insecure, have back doors, or other cyber problems. Logically, the conclusion is that there are no back doors to be found. Or they are so good that no one can find them, especially the secret services whose job it is to find them.
It’s common knowledge that Huawei has more quality problems (which is my view) than most vendors, but the cheaper price makes up for that. The cheaper price is the capitalist dream and so companies want to buy Huawei.
If Huawei’s day-to-day quality is poor, it’s hard to believe they can produce undetectable back doors. You can form your opinion about whether Cisco’s history of security vulnerabilities is any worse or better based on many, many severe CVEs.
So when this article proposes:
Could it be that Huawei’s offense is not cooperating with U.S. spying, unlike Nokia & Ericsson? I have no evidence, but it’s a plausible inference.
This is a reasonable speculation. It might not be the only reason, but it might be a big one.
Blasphemy: The U.S. Problem Is Huawei’s Security Is Too Good : http://www.circleid.com/posts/20191024_blasphemy_the_us_problem_is_huaweis_security_is_too_good/